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NOTES
TORTIOUS INDUCEMENT TO SUICIDE: A
STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL OSTRICH
I
POLICY AND THE JUDICIAL OSTRICH
Although tortious injuries generally give rise to liability, English and
American judges have been particularly solicitous to insure
compensation for injuries violating the sanctity of the body. Limiting
concepts like foreseeability have been stretched or ignored to allow a
diseased plaintiff to recover for injuries aggravating his illness,2 to
allow a plaintiff recovery for illness when an injury has rendered him
susceptible to disease, and, most startling, to allow recovery for the
consequences of a disease which would probably have been contracted
even if the injury had not occured?
Despite this general tendency favoring compensation, the courts have
virtually refused to allow recovery for tortiously induced suicide.'
Recovery is allowed only if the suicide is committed in a state of rage
or frenzy, or if it results from an irresistible impulse? Although the
courts diverge in their interpretations of "irresistible impulse,"' their
I. Dean Prosser suggests that there may be a "magic circle" drawn around the body, and that
anyone who breaks it, no matter how slightly, becomes liable for all the harm that may result
therefrom. W. PROssER, LAW OF ToRTs 300 (3d ed. 1964).
2. Id. at 300 and cases collected.
3. Id. at 319. In the latter case, as Dean Prosser points out, "there are few cases." Id. at 300
n.l.
4. No printed appellate decision has been found which affirms a verdict for damages resulting
from suicide caused by tortious conduct. A more typical decision simply states the rule and then
holds, as a matter of law, that the deceased's conduct was such that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action. See, e.g., Appling v. Jones, 115 Ga. App. 301, 154 S.E.2d 406 (1967); Stasiof
v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 50 111. App. 2d 115, 200 N.E.2d 88 (1964); Koch v. Fox, 71 App.
Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913, later appeal Koch v. Zimmermann, 85 App. Div. 370, 83 N.Y.S. 339
(1903).
5. See, e.g., Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 3 Ariz. App. 330, 414 P.2d 179 (1966); Stasiof
v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 115, 200 N.E.2d 88 (1964); Daniels v. New York
N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138
(Mo. 1963); Bogustv. Iverson, 10 Wis.2d 129, 102 N.W.2d 228 (1960).
6. The older decisions, following the criminal law, hold that, when the decedent's actions are
deliberate and rational, he is not subject to an "irresistable impulse," but acting in accord with
his own volition. See Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 571-72, 88 N.E.
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decisions render recovery virtually impossible in circumstances short of
complete loss of bodily control! The restrictive rule is justified as an
elaboration on the requirement that the defendant's action be the
proximate cause of the deceased's injury Under this rationale, the
voluntary act of the deceased is regarded as an "intervening" or
-superseding" cause of death, insulating the actor from liability!
At best these decisions inadequately explain the basis for utilizing the
notion of proximate cause. Proximate cause is, in reality, only a
synonym for public policy." As a result, the rules governing proximate
cause normally vary immensely dependly on the particular tort for
which recovery is sought." In failing to articulate the reasons for
applying the proximate cause doctrine, however, the courts have
ignored distinctions between the various types of torts.'2 Rules
governing the ability to recover for damages caused by negligence have
been applied indiscriminately to intentional torts. For example, the
intention of the wrongdoer may be to inflict pain, suffering or mental
distress, and his actions may be successful to the point of precipitating
suicide. Nonetheless, the deceased's ability to kill himself in a rational
manner may block recovery if the court regards it as an "intervening
force" breaking the chain of causation. 3
80. 85 (1909) *'I[f the decedent at the time of taking his life had mind enough to know what he
wanted to do, and how to do it, the line of causation from the accident to the death would be
broken b, the act of suicide and the latter would be the proximate cause of his death." Accord
Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1965); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash.
137, 292 P. 436 (1930). Contra, Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102
(1961), modifying the rule set out in Arsnow, supra, the court said: "lI]t is not proper [the
4rsnow rule] in a case where there is medical testimony that the injury sustained by the decedent
caused a mental condition which resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide in the
sense that the decedent could not have decided against and refrained from killing himself, and
because of such uncontrollable impulse committed suicide." Id. at 853, 364 P.2d at 1105. The
best articulation of the new rule is found in Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr.
28(1960).
7 See note4,supra.
8 See. eg., Scheffer v. Washington City, 105 U.S. 249 (1882); Daniels v. New York N.H. &
H R R Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); McMahon v. New York, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190
(Sup Ct 1955)
9 The voluntary nature of the decedent's acts serves as ground to differentiate these cases from
those in which the tortious injury of the defendant aggravated a pre-existing condition. Long v.
Omaha & C.B. Street R.R., 108 Neb. 342, 351-52, 187 N.W.2d 930, 934 (1922). The theory is
similar to contributory negligence. See also, note 29, infra and accompany text.
11 See RESTrAEMENT OF TORTS § 279, and comment c (1934).
12 Salsedo v Palmer, 278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921); Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E.
564 (1913).
13 Lancaster v. Montesi, 390 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1965). The original Restatement's treatment
of the rule allowing recovery if suicide is the result of an irrestible impulse or frenzy is somewhat
Vol. 1970: 166]
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A. The distinction between intentional and negligent torts.
Until 1960, no case dealing with tortiously induced suicide had held
that the tortfeasor's liability might depend upon whether his action was
negligent or intentional and, if intentional, what consequences his
action was intended to bring about 4 Such distinctions, however, long
had been recognized in other contexts.
The Restatement (First) of Torts, in considering the law applicable
to conduct intended to cause bodily harm, suggested that such
intentional conduct was the "legal cause of any bodily harm of the type
intended . . . which it is a substantial factor in bringing about."' The
comments to the Restatement section point out two important
differences between this rule, as it applies to intentional torts, and the
causal relationship necessary to find a negligent action the legal cause
of an injury.
First, if the tort is intentional, the foreseeability of the injury is
ignored. If the actor's "conduct has created a situation harmless unless
acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible," he
is still liable for the plaintiffs injury. 6 Secondly, the conduct need only
more liberal than that of the cases upon which it is based. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 455,
illustration 3 (1934):
A negligently injures B. The injuries cause insanity which takes the form of suicidal mania.
While suffering in this condition, B locks his door to prevent interference and cuts his
throat with a knife he has secreted and sharpened for that purpose. A's negligence is the
legal cause of B's death or other harm resulting from his cutting his throat.
Compare cases cited note 6, supra.
14. There was a hint in Cauverien v. DeMetz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct
1959).
15. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 279 (1934):
If the actor's conduct is intended by him to bring about bodily harm to another which
the actor is not privileged to inflict, it is the legal cause of any bodily harm of the type
intended by him which it is a substantial factor in bringing about.
16. Id., comment c:
The rule stated in this Section as determining the causal relation necessary to make the
actor liable for bodily harm of the type which he intends to inflict differs in several
important particulars from those which determine the causal relation necessary to make a
negligent actor liable for harm resulting from his negligence.
First, in determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm of the type which he intended to inflict upon the other, no consideration is
given to the fact that after the event it appears highly extraordinary that it should have
brought about such harm or that the actor's conduct has created a situation harmless
unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible. . ..
Second, all that is necessary to make the actor liable under the rule stated in this Section
is that his conduct is a substantial factor in brining about an injury of the type he intended
to inflict. There are no rules which relieve the actor from liability because of the manner
in which his conduct has resulted in the injury such as there are where the liability of a
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be a substantial factor in causing the injury. It makes no difference that
the "actor's conduct becomes effective in harm only through the
intervention of new and independent forces for which the actor is not
responsible." Nor does it matter whether the intervening force is of
a wrongful nature.' Section 280 applies the rule governing intentional
infliction of bodily harm to other "interests in personality," and
applies the comments relating to bodily harm to the "other interests."' 9
The Restatement's reference to legal cause is the touchstone of the
distinction. When dealing with questions of liability, courts must
determine whether, as a matter of law, allowing recovery would be
consistent with public policy.? If it is not, they speak in terms of failure
to show proximate causation, although actual causation may be
apparent." The Restatement sections and comments make it plain that
foreseeability and intervening forces have no role, as a matter of policy,
when the harm caused is within the class of the harm intended. Rather,
in this situation the tortious act constitutes the legal or proximate cause
of the injury if it substantially contributes to it! 2
In 1960 the California District Court of Appeals applied the
distinction between intentional and negligent torts to tortiously induced
suicide. In Tate v. Canonica,3 the plaintiff had alleged that the
defendants made threats, statements and accusations against the
deceased to harass and humiliate him, that these statements caused him
to become mentally disturbed, and that as a result of this disturbance
he committed suicide. A second count alleged that the defendants'
negligent actor is in question. Therefore, the fact that the actor's conduct becomes effective
in harm only through the intervention of new and independent forces for which the actor
is not responsible is of no importance. So too, the fact that the operation of the new force
was unexpectable by the actor or even that after the event it appeared highly extraordinary
that it had operated does not relieve the actor from liability for harm of the type which




19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 280 (1934).
20 See. e g, the concurring opinion in Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash.2d 846, 364 P.2d
1102 (1%1) The dissenting judge argued against the extension of the "irresistible impulse" test
for tortiously induced suicide on the basis of proximate cause. The concurring opinion argues that
in a motion to dimiss because of inadequate evidence on which to go to the jury, proximate cause
is inappropriate. It is a policy matter more appropriately decided on demurrer or when specifically
raised by the parties.
21 W PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 283-84 (3d ed. 1964).
22 See note 16. supra.
23. 180 Cal. App. 2d898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
Vol. 1970: 166]
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actions were negligent! 4 The trial court sustained a demurrer against
both counts. The California Supreme Court reversed. In its extensive
opinion, the Court raises the major problems arising out of attempts
to recover damages for suicide.
First, the Court notes that the petition alleges that the defendants'
acts were done for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, but
without any intent to cause the deceased to commit suicide., Admitting
that earlier cases seem to support a rule that suicide is an intervening
act "breaking the chain" of causation, the Court embarks on an
independent analysis. It begins by noting that at one time suicide was
itself regarded as a crime. It then assumes that the "unspoken" major
premise of decisions holding suicide nonactionable was the criminality
attached to it. Because California does not recognize suicide as a crime,
this premise is inoperative! 6
On the other hand, the Tate Court says, the law increasingly has
been willing to hold persons liable when they intentionally cause mental
distressY Pointing next to the Restatement (First) of Torts, sections
279 and 280, the Court asserts that if an action is deliberately
committed, causation can be shown if the tort is a substantial factor
in bringing about the kind of harm which was intended.28 Any
introduction of proximate cause must rest on a public policy which
mitigates against a recovery. The Tate Court fails to find such a policy.
The tort was intentional. On the basis of sections 279 and 280 of the
Restatement, then, there is no reason to disallow recovery because the
defendant "knew what he was doing." Because contributory negligence
is no defense to an intentional tort in California, that defense, which
might be made by analogy, is unavailable.2' The Court concludes its
analysis by saying that if the defendant intended to cause serious
mental distress and does so, and if the distress is shown to be a
substantial factor in bringing about the suicide, a cause of action is
24. Id. at 900,5 Cal. Rptr. at31.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 903, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
27. The court quotes extensively from its decision in State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) to show the California policy favoring imposition
of liabiliy in these situations. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 905-06, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28,
34-35 (1960).
28. Tatev. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898,906-08,5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 35-36 (1960).
29. Id. at 909, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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stated. The mental state of the suicide victim becomes irrelevant3 The
Court then analyzes and distinguishes various cases 3
Two serious problems in the Court's reasoning should be noted.
First, sections 279 and 280 of the Restatement dispense with the
normal considerations of proximate cause only when the injury
sustained is within the class of injuries that the tortfeasor intended to
inflict3 2 In Tate the tortfeasor intended to, and did, inflict emotional
distress. His actions, then, under the rationale of sections 279 and 280,
need only be shown to have contributed substantially to any emotional
distress in order to be considered its legal cause. But the causal link
between the emotional distress and the suicide is not established by the
rationale of sections 279 and 280. That rationale only justifies the
equation between substantial factor and legal cause if suicide is within
the class of intended harms. This is not to fault the conclusion of the
California Court. Suicide can quite properly be regarded as no more
than a manifestation of extreme emotional distress and squarely within
the category of intended harm.3 But if this assumption is attributed to
the Court as an unconscious, sub-silentio premise, the only support for
it is the statement that: "all recorded history testifies that there are
cases in which serious mental suffering is in fact a cause of suicide." 3"
An analysis of the validity of an equation between serious mental
distress and suicide as a manifestation thereof becomes, then, essential
to the Court's ability to utilize the definition of legal cause found in
sections 279 and 280.
It is noteworthy, however, that an alternative rationale is now
available within which to consider the question of proximate cause.
Section 312 of the Restatement (Second), published five years after the
Tate decision, provides that when one intentionally subjects another to
emotional distress, and when the actor should realize that it is likely
to result in some kind of illness or bodily harm, the actor is liable for
30. Id. at 912, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
31 The second part of the Court's opinion deals with the question of negligence. It reasons,
in accord with the modern rule of "irresistible impulse" that some rational conduct is not
inconsistent with a holding that the deceased was not able to control his actions. Id. at 913, 5
Cal. Rptr at 46.
32. See note 16, supra.
33 The suggestion has been made that "[pisychiatrically well (normal) persons never or very
rarely make suicide attempts, regardless of the severity of the social stresses to which they are
subjected " Robins, Schmidt a O'Neal, Some Interrelations of Social Factors and Clinical
Diagnosis in Attempted Suicide: A Study of 109 Patients, 20 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 25 (No. 3,
1956) It must also be kept in mind that every completed suicide includes a suicidal attempt.
34. 180 Cal. App. 2d 898,912,5 Cal. Rptr 28,45 (1960).
Vol. 1970: 1661
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the illness "for which the distress is the legal cause." 35 The section
discounts the presence of actual intention to inflict the ultimate illness
or harm. This rationale would avoid the problem in Tate, in which the
defendants did not intend to cause the deceased to commit suicide. The
comments clearly state that the actor need not intend to cause the harm
or even know with substantial certainty that his action will cause any
harm 6 They further assert that it is not necessary that "the distress
which he intends to cause is one which would be likely to cause bodily
harm to a person of average resistance to emotional distress. '37
If suit is brought on the basis of intentional torts like malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, or slander, it can be assumed that
the defendant should recognize that his conduct would cause bodily
harm or illness.38 Supporting recognition of the causal relationship
between intentional actions and physical and emotional illness is a line
of decisions creating a tort action specifically granting recovery for
"intentional infliction of emotional distress. ' 3 To be sure, the
alternative route of 312 would leave a court with much the same
dilemma which led to the utilization of sections 279 and 280. Under
312 the illness or bodily harm must be legally caused by the inflicted
distress, but utilizing 312 has the advantage of focusing on the question
of legal cause. Suicide does result in bodily harm and may be a
symptom of mental disease!' The 312 rationale forces the question of
whether the defendant's action should be, or even can be, considered
the legal cause of the disease and therefore of the bodily harm. An
answer to this question demands: (1) an investigation of the causes in
fact of suicide, i.e., both the sociological and psychological causes, and
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312 (1965). The section reads:
If the actor intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to emotional distress which
he should recognize as likely to result in illness -or other bodily harm, he is subject to
liability to the other for an illness or other bodily harm of which the distress is a legal
cause,
(a) although the actdr has no intention of inflicting such harm ...
§ 312 became official in 1965.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312, comment d (1965).
37. Id. at comment e.
38. Comment b to section 312 makes it clear that it is because of the defendant's neglience in
failing to foresee that his conduct might cause illness or bodily harm that the section is included.
39. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 51,52 (3d ed. 1964).
40. See L. DUBLIN & B. BUNZEL, To BE OR NOT TO BE: A STUDY OF SUICIDE 300-18 (1933)
[hereinafter cited as DUBLIN]; E. STENGEL, SUICIDE & ATTEMPTED SUICIDE 51-56 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as STENGEL].
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the possibility that the tort may have exacerbated the latent disease or
induced its development; and, (2) a consideration of the legal propriety
of considering such an analysis in the light of psychological knowledge
on the one hand and the public's interest in providing compensation
to victims of wrong-doing on the other.
The second problem with the Tate decision is its assumption that the
previous cases were sub-silentio based on an abhorrence of suicide
manifested in its illegality. None of the cases dealing with suicide as
an element of damages mentions the legal or illegal nature of the act.
All of them do, however, implicitly indicate a concern with
foreseeability," an ability to prove cause in fact 42 and a fear of
allowing the plaintiff's deceased to intentionally exacerabte his
damages." The Tate Court's reliance on a novel premise explains its
cavalier treatment of basic policy issues. It also explains the Court's
unconscious assumption that the same Restatement generalities that
enabled it to dispense with policy considerations in considering the
actual emotional distress the injury caused, enable it to dispense with
consideration of these issues in determining whether to allow recovery
for the suicide the emotional distress may have led to.
In spite of these unfortunate oversights, the Tate decision shows a
court willing to overcome seemingly unquestionable precedent and lift
the judicial head out of the sand of proximate cause. In Tate, the
distinction between intentional and negligent causes of suicide was
recognized. This was, in the light of precedent, a substantial
accomplishment. The California Court found only four cases, out of
all the tortiously caused suicide actions, which dealt specifically with
the problem before it." One of these, Salsedo v. Palmer,5 arrived at a
conclusion completely opposite to that of the Tate Court. The other
41 Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 3 Ariz. App. 330, 414 P.2d 179 (1966); Appling v.
Jones, 115 Ga. App. 301, 154 S.E.2d 406 (1967); Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind.
App. 560,88 N.E. 80 (1909).
42 Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680,683-84,79 S.E. 564,567-68 (1913).
43 McMahon v. New York, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ("In the circumstances
of this case one may not aggravate the decedent's damage by willful and deliberate self-
destruction.") See also Stasiof v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 30 Ill. App. 2d 115, 122-23, 200
N.E.2d 88,92 (1964) quoting the above language from McMahon.
44. Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921); Cauverien v. De Metz, 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188
N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Jones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176, 191 S.W.2d 439 (1946); Stevens
v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680,79 S.E. 564 (1913).
45 278 F.92 (2dCir. 1921).
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three cases either can be read only tangentially as supporting the Tate
holding or must be distinguished!'
B. The Evolution of Confusion
Scheffer v. Washington City 7 is the leading and most frequently
cited case dealing with tortiously induced suicide. In Scheffer, the
plaintiff's deceased was negligently injured in a train accident. It was
alleged that as a result he became insance and lost all power of reason.
Because of pain and insanity, he committed suicide eight months after
the accident. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court refused to find that
the suicide was "proximately caused" by the accident. The Court,
applying familiar negligence reasoning, held the suicide was not
"naturally and reasonably to be expected from the injury received on
the train."" Because it "could not have been foreseen in the light of
circumstances attending the negligence" of the defendants, the Court
denied recovery. 9 Clearly, the Scheffer Court was applying policy
normally associated with negligent torts, i.e., examining forseeability in
determining liability. Intentional torts were not considered: the court
spoke solely in terms of negligence.
The next three cases to be decided all involved negligent physical
injuries which allegedly brought about suicide by causing insanity or
derangement. 0 Of the three the most important is Daniels v. New
York, N.H. & H.R. Co.51 The Daniels case articulated the rule
generally cited as controlling in cases of negligently induced suicide.
The Daniels court stated that it would only uphold liability if the
suicide were "the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or [were]
accomplished in delirium or frenzy . . . without conscious volition to
produce death, having knowledge of the physical nature and
consequences of the act.'5 2 The volition of the deceased was regarded,
apparently, as an independent force. The defendant's negligence,
apparently as a matter of policy, would not make him responsible for
46. All three of these cases are discussed, infra.
47. Scheffer v. Washington C., Va., M., & G. So. R.R., 105 U.S. 249 (1882).
48. Id. at 252.
49. Id.
50. Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (App. Ct. 1909);
Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903); Koch v. Fox, 71
App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913, later appeal Koch v. Zimmermann, 85 App. Div. 370, 83 N.Y.S.
339 (1902).
51. 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903).
52. Id. at 395, 67 N.E. at 426.
Washington University Open Scholarship
TORTIOUS INDUCEMENT TO SUICIDE
the manner in which the volition operated. The other cases articulated
a similar rule, but, like the Daniels court, they did little more than cite
the Sche//er decision to buttress their assertions.
The next suicide case involved an intentional tort. In Stevens v.
Sieadman, 3 the plaintiff's deceased was the vice president of a
corporation, allegedly a highly excitable and nervous person. The
defendants sent him a letter saying that he should resign from his
position for the good of the company. They also threatened that if he
did not resign they would resign themselves. They told him that for his
own good, that of his family and that of the company, they would not
discuss the reasons behind their actions with anyone, including him.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants tendered the ultimatum intending
to drive decedent to suicide, but the only fact on which to base that
inference was the letter itself. The court held as a matter of law that
there was no way of proving that the letter had caused the suicide, at
least in the absence of such proof in the letter had caused the suicide,
at least in the absence of such proof in the letter itself?4 There was no
way to know what state of mind the deceased may have been put in
by receipt of the letter 5
Steadman, it should be noted, is explainable on grounds other than
judicial disfavor of suicide recoveries. First, the proof of intent was
totally lacking, even accepting the allegations of the petition as true.
Secondly, 1913, Georgia, like all the other states, refused to recognize
that emotional distress could result from intentional conduct without
some sort of physical injury and impact. This explains the court's
reluctance to consider the issue of causation. Thirdly, the inference of
causation in fact, i.e., that the letter caused the decedent to commit
suicide, was extraordinarily tenuous on its face.
The next case to be decided was Salsedo v. Palmer.6 Although
entirely at odds with the Tate decision, the underpinnings of this case
are, to say the least, weak. I n Salsedo, plaintiff's deceased, having been
falsely arrested and tortured, jumped from a twenty-one story window
while still imprisoned. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals57 discussed
liability for the intentional tort in terms of proximate cause, without
53. 140 Ga. 680,79 S.E. 564 (1913).
54 Id at 683, 79 S.E. at 567.
55 Id at683-84,79S.E. at567-68.
56 278 F.92 (2dCir. 1921).
57 Action %as brought against the deceased's captors in state court. The United States
Attorney General, named as a defendant, obtained removal to federal court. Id.
Vol. 1970: 166]
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noticing, in the guiding language it quoted, a limitation applying the
proximate cause principle only to cases not involving "wanton"
activity.58 Ignoring the distinction drawn by the very authority it cited,
the Second Circuit reasoned:
It is conceivably, therefore, that a tortured man may kill himself. But,
if he so kills himself deliberately, we hold that there is an intervening
act of his own will for which the New York [wrongful death] act affords
no remedy?
This is no more than the application of the Daniels rule, articulated in
a negligence case, to a situation involving an intentional tort. The
court's next assertion, however, is startling, though it does dispose of
the "frenzy" half of the Daniels test:
If, on the other hand, it is contended that his self-killing is not his own
act, but is the result of suicidal mania, we hold that suicidal mania is
not a natural or reasonable result of either mental or physical torture.
It is a most unreasonable inference... P
Indicating the basis for its reasoning, the court stated that they were
content to base [their] decision solely on the authority of Scheffer
because no grounds for distinction exist between the two cases. 1
Of course-as the California Court pointed out in Tate-Scheffer
and Salsedo are, contrary to the assertion of the Second Circuit, easily
distinguishable. One involved a negligent tort, and a policy decision
based on proximate cause and reasonable forseeability was appropriate;
the other involved an intentional wrong in which the relevant
considerations are different. The harm intended in Salsedo, although
definitely an intentional tort case, might not have been such that public
policy would justify the imposition of liability. That does not, however,
justify the court's utilization of negligence policy to decide non-
negligence cases. Apparently neither Salsedo nor Scheffer recognize the
difference between intentional and negligent torts because neither
articulate why suicide is unforseeable. Salsedo exacerbates the problem
by the court's failure to detail why foreseeability is even an issue at all.
58. "... [I]n order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not amounting to a wanton
wrong, is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and
probable consequence of the negligence. . . ... Id. at 96.
59. Id. at 99.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Despite its inadequacies, Salsedo had an overwhelming effect on
subsequent decisions.62
Cauverien v. DeMetz, a 1959 New York decision, illustrates the
difficulty inherent in the confusion between negligent and intentional
torts. 3 There, there, the deceased, in accord with the custom of his
trade, took possession of a diamond from a wholesaler on an informal
consignment agreeing to return the stone, or its value, on demand. The
defendant, a diamond broker, took the stone from deceased on the
same terms. The defendants told the deceased that they did not intend
to deliver up the diamond, its value, or acknowledge possession.
Plaintiff stated three causes of action: (1) that the defendant
intentionally created emotional distress and blackened the name of the
plaintiff's deceased; (2) conversion; and, (3) that the malicious and
intentional conversions caused an irresistible impulse which caused the
suicide. 4 The court merged the first count into the second, because
damages could be recovered in conversion for emotional distress. The
third count was held to allege "insanity" and therefore to state a cause
62 In 1946 the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Jones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176, 191 S.W.2d
439 (1946). In Jones, the deceased, an 18 year old boy, was accused of stealing. The accuser had
no probable cause for the accusation. As a result, the boy hung himself. The court held that there
was no proximate cause between the accusation and the hanging. In reaching its decision the court
quoted from Salsedo. Daniels and Steadman. As has been noted, Salsedo is less than impecably
reasoned; Daniels is a negligence case; and, Steadman was decided on the basis of an inability to
prove intent or causation. The Jones court noted that the deceased acted deliberately. The day
before his suicide he placed a ring on his girl friend's finger with tears in his eyes, saying that he
would not need it where he was going. The court then quotes from Chattanooga Light & Power,
another Tennessee decision which disallowed recovery when an injury is the result of the plaintiff's
own acts if they are so "fraught with peril" that a person of reasonable intelligence would be
deterred from doing them. If despite the danger, the plaintiff acts in an unreasonable manner "it
would seem impossible to find any ground upon which to maintain that the person guilty of the
first act of negligence should be held liable." (emphasis added).
Obviously the court was applying negligence policy. As the Tate court pointd out, contributory
negligence is usually no defense to an intentional tort. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898,
909, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 41 (1960). It cannot be determined, of course, whether the accusations in
Jones were made negligently, or were made with the intent of causing emotional distress; if the
former, negligence law was proper to apply. But if the action was malicious, the Tennessee court
on the spurious basis of Salsedo, applied a rule which had no bearing on the facts before it.
It should be noted that in 1965, in a brief decision which failed to even cite the Tate case, the
Tennessee court held that a plaintiff had no cause of action when the deceased, a paramour of
the defendant, was driven to suicide by sadistic torture. The court merely held that she knew the
consequences of her actions and therefore "(H)er voluntary act was an abnormal thing.... "
The court relied merely on the Jones case. Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 27, 390 S.W.2d 217
(1965)
63 20 Misc. 2d 144, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1959).
64. Id. at 146, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
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of action within the traditional tests of tortiously induced suicide!5
Although the holding required no discussion of the differences between
intentional and negligent torts, the court stated that if the wrong
inflicted were intentional, "the wrongdoer is responsible for the injuries
directly caused even though they may be beyond the limits of
foreseeability."66 Policy, apparently, would not keep the plaintiff from
the jury when an intentional wrong was involved and the court denied
that difficulty of proof should be a ground for depriving the plaintiff
of his day in court.!7
Despite its recognition of distinctions between intentional and
negligent torts the court accedes to the old line of cases. "[T]he
overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that a suicide-absent
insanity-is a new and independent agency which breaks the causal
connection between the wrongful act and death." . . . To support this
position it cites none other than Scheffer, a negligence case, and
Salsedo, which it had explicitly refused to follow rearlier in its opinion.
The Cauverein court's confusion is evident, as are the inadequacies
of the Tate decision. Before proposing a more solid basis for legal rules
deliniating the ability to recover for suicide, the psychological and
sociological bases for self-killing must be considered.
65. Id. at 149, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33.
66. Id.
67. Id.
Upon this complaint the wrong is alleged to be intentional, and therefore the wrongdoer
is responsible for the injuries directly caused even though they may be beyond the limits
of foreseeability. Where, as here, reliance is placed upon the wilful and malicious intent
to commit a wrongful act, the question of whether death by suicide could be the natural,
proximate and legal consequence of the tort is one for the jury. . . .Nor can it (the court)
say that the result is too tenuous or speculative merely because of difficulty or
improbability of proof.
68. Id. The court states as its holding:
[ . .CT]he court construes the allegation of irresistible impulse in the third cause of action
as sufficient to constitute an allegation of insanity. Under the first cause of action, the
allegation of mere emotional upset is insufficient, even if that cause were otherwise
sustainable.
Id. A 1968 Mississippi decision is strikingly similar to Cauverien in its confusion. Though
intentional torts were alleged in the complaint, i.e. abuse of process and malicious prosecution, the
court held that the issue should go to trial on the question of irresistible impulse. The court said:
Since plaintiff's evidence supports those factors (irresistible impulse), we do not reach the
additional issues considered in Tate v. Canonica, which allowed recovery for suicide caused
by an intentional tort if the mental stress which the defendant inflicted was a substantial
cause of the suicide, even if the decedent was aware of his act and was not responding to
an irresistable impulse.
State e. rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, - Miss. 214 So. 2d 579,586 (1968).
Washington University Open Scholarship
TORTIOUS INDUCEMENT TO SUICIDE
II
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL & SOCIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF SUICIDE: SAND FOR
THE OSTRICH.
Frequently linked with ideologies of death, 9 suicide has often
connoted evil. To primitive societies, its occurrence foreshadowed
disaster,70 but as civilization progressed, ambivalence developed. In
Ancient Greece and Rome, abhorrence mixed with cautious approval
on the part of a few!' Later, in spite of the proscription of suicide by
the Medieval Church72 men continued to argue for a more lenient
attitude towards it.73 By the late nineteenth century, suicide had
generated substantial interest among pioneering social scientists74
including Emile Durkheim, whose classic work Le Suicide applied the
scientific method to its study.
Disinterested in psychology, 76  Durkheim focused upon the
relationship between society and the individual who committed suicide.
He defined the act in terms of its consequences: "the term suicide is
applied to all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a
positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will
produce this result." Armed with this operative definition, Durkheim
undertook an empirical analysis which distinguished three types of
suicide: egotistic, altruistic and anomic. Egotistic suicide arose from
excessive individualism. It occurred when the individual was
69. STENGEL at 57.Seealso DUBLIN at 137-53.
70 STENGEL at 57.
71 See. eg., DUBLIN at 183-96; F. WINSLOW, THE ANATOMY OF SUICIDE 1-29 (1840)
[hereinafter cited as WINSLOW]; STENGEL at 60-61; Porterfield, The Problem of Suicide 37-39 in
SUICIDE (J Gibbs ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Porterfield].
72. See DUBLIN at 197-210; STENGEL at 61.
73 See DUBLIN at 211-17; WINSLOW at 30-35; Porterfield at 41-45. Reference should also be
made to the concept of suicide in the non-Western world. As in the West, suicide may be looked
upon as a self-destructive act, especially today in nations like Japan where Westernization has
ben influential. See Iga & Ohara, Suicide Attempts of Japanese Youth and Durkheim's Concept
of.4nomie: An Interpretation, 26 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 59-68 (Spring-Summer 1967). But
elsewhere in Asia, self-destructive acts lack completely the negative connotations which Western
culture so readily imputes to them. Suicide in these areas is viewed as an affirmation of life
whereby one returns to Nature, not an act in contravention of it. See Hope, The Reluctant Way:
Self-Immolation in Vietnam, THE ANTIOCH REVIEW 149-63 (Summer 1967).
74 DULIN at 228.
75. E. DURKEHIM, SUICIDE (1951) [hereinafter cited as DURKHEIM].
76. See SUICIDE 7 (J. Gibbs ed. 1968) (Durkehim was "an implacable foe of psychological
explanations.. ." [hereinafter cited as GIBBS]. Yet, this is qualified in R. MARIS, SOCIAL FORCES
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insufficiently integrated into his society. A strongly integrated society
controlled its members, demanded that society's interests take priority
over those of the individual and forbad self-destruction as detrimental
to that priority. As this integration weakened however, each man
gradually became master of his own destiny which included the
privilege to end his own life!8 Altruistic suicide, on the other hand,
stemmed from excessive integration. The duty of self-sacrifice, not the
privilege of choosing death, motivated the altruistic actor to whom
society had allowed too little individualism. Especially common to
primitive societies, this category comprehended suicides of the old and
sick, of recent widows, and of followers on their leader's death!' The
individual, considering himself a burden on society, illed himsel in an
effort to relieve that burden. Durkheim's final category, anomic
suicide, included those acts resulting from disruptions of the society,
such as economic disasters or sudden wealth. During these periods,
society's influence momentarily failed, leaving man ungoverned and
susceptible to individual passions including self-destruction'
Durkehim's analysis of suicide, although subject to valid criticism,"
ranks as the acknowledged starting point for subsequent studies. The
concept of social integration as a factor in suicide has been particularly
influential with later sociologists. Gibbs and Martin, having pegged
social integration as the major factor in Durkheim's theory, formulate
a theorem, deduced from five postulates, that "[t]he suicide rate of a
78. "The more weakened the groups to which he belongs, the less he depends only on himself
and recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his private interests." Id. at
209. Thus, for example, the Roman Catholic, being a member of a heirarchical authoritarian
system that frowned upon any deviation, had a lower suicide rate than his Protestant counterpart
whose religion emphasized greater individualism and free inquiry. Protestantism, forcing the
individual to make his own decisions, rendered him more susceptible to suicide, even though that
act was officially proscribed. Id. at 157-68.
79. DURKHEIM at 217-221.
80. "But when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transition,
it is momentarily incapable of exercising this influence; thence come the sudden rises in the curve
of suicides. . . ." Id. at 252.
81. J. GIBBS & W. MARTIN, STATUS INTEGRATION AND SUICIDE 5-10 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as GIaBs & MARTIN]; MARIS at 30-44 (a summary of Durkheim's theory which includes comments
as to the weak or ambiguous parts of it). In addition there exists an implicit, if not explicit,
disagreement with Durkheim's definition of suicide which omits the area of attempted suicide
(whether or not resulting in death) and yet which assumes that all completed suicides were
intended to result in death. See Blaine & Carmen, Causal Factors in Suicidal Attempts by Male
and Female College Students, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 834-37 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BLAINE
& CARMEN]; Piker, Eighteen Hundred and Seventeen Cases of Suicidal Attempt. A Preliminary
Statistical Survey, 95 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 97, 113 (1938) [hereinafter cited as PIKER; Weiss, The
Gamble With Death in Attempted Suicide, PSYCHIATRIC Q. 17-25 (1957).
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population varies inversely with the degree of status integration in that
population.""2 They present extensive empirical support for their
theorem, testing it by the variables of age, race, sex and marital status
all of which is convincing only if the five underlying postulates are
assumed to be true. By admitting that their first postulate is not
directly testable,8 3 they weaken their conclusions. Nevertheless, the
analysis points out the tremendous difficulties of reconciling the
variables that influence suicide. For example, to assert that married
persons have a lower suicide rate than unmarried persons ignores other
factors like age, race or status which may also have motivated suicide.
Recognizing the complexity of the self-destructive act, Gibbs and
Martin discuss extensively this problem of interacting variables.
Emphasizing another aspect of Durkehim's theory, Henry and Short
examine anomic suicide by testing the influence of economic change
upon the suicide rate. Their theory finds a basis in three assumptions:
"(1) aggression is often a consequence of frustration; (2) business
cycles produce variation in the heirarchical ranking of persons and
groups; (3) frustrations are generated by interference with the 'goal
response' of maintaining a constant or r sing position in a status
hierarchy relative to the status position of others in the same status
reference system.""5 Consequently, strong external restraint due to
either subordinate status or intense involvement in social relationships
with others makes it easy to blame the latter when frustration arises.
82 GraBs & MARTIN at 27. The five postulates serve to translate Durkheim's merely suggestive
idea of social integration into a testable concept. The postulates are:
1. The suicide rate of a population varies inversely with the stability and durability of
social ralationships within the population.
2. The stability and durability of social relationships within a population vary directly
with the extent to which individuals in that population conform to the patterned and
socially sanctioned demands and expectations placed upon them by others.
3 The extent to which individuals in a population conform to patterned and socially
sanctioned demands and expectations placed upon them by others varies inversely with the
extent to which individuals in that population are confronted with role conflicts.
4 The extent to which individuals in a population are confronted with role conflicts
varies directly with the extent to which individuals occupy incompatible statuses in that
population.
5. The extent to which individuals occupy incompatible statuses in a population varies
inversely with the degree of status integration in that population.
Id.
83 Id. at 17.
84 See. e.g., Id. at 101-03.
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But weak external restraints cause the self to assume responsibility for
frustration, resulting in a greater likelihood of suicide. 6 A major
hypothesis of Henry and Short, that high status categories have higher
suicide rates than low status categories,8 7 derives directly from
Durkehim.Ps Although presenting copious data on age, sex, race and
income to prove their theory, Henry and Short betray weakness by
their inflexible categorization of various traits as being either of high
or low status. That one suicidal individual may possess traits of both
high and low status (as defined by Henry and Short) casts doubt on
their hypothesis of a direct relationship between status and suicide and
the assertion that suicide varies inversely with external restraint 9
The work of Gibbs and Martin, Henry and Short, and others
following Durkehim's lead," emphasizes the quest for theories of
suicide. It uses empirical data primarily to support hypotheses. But
other studies insist less upon discovering systematic theories than upon
gathering data. Sainsbury's ecological investigation does this "by
examining the differences in suicide tate in various neighborhoods and
social groups in London and interpreting these in terms of their social
and cultural structure."9 Although the study originates in Durkheim's
identification with his society, 2 the emphasis is field research, not
theory. 3 By pointing out statistically the contributions of these
variables to suicide and the difficulties of evaluation,94 Sainsbury
suggests new avenues for research while providing well-documented
evidence.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 15, 27, 70.
88. DURKHEIM at 165 ("Now, although the statistics of suicide by occupation and classes
cannot be obtained with sufficient accuracy, it is undeniably expectionally frequent in the highest
classes of society.")
89. HENRY & SHORT, at 70-71. It is assumed that whites, males, high income groups, the
young and middle-aged and military officers are high status persons whereas Negroes, females,
low income groups, the aged and enlisted men are of low status. Such a categorization takes
no cognizance of a mixture, as for example the high-income, sixty-five year old Negro. Although
Henry and Short acknowledge the tenative nature of their rankings, they nevertheless utilize
these figures to make absolute comparisons of suicide rates, thus severely weakening the credibility
and usefulness of their statistics. For other critiques of Henry and Short, See Lester, Henry
and Short on Suicide: A Critique. 70 J. PSYCHOLOGY 179-85 (1968).
90. See M. FARBER, THEORY OF SUICIDE (1968); MAR1s at 177-89.
91. P. SAINSBURY, SUICIDE IN LONDON 11 (1956) [hereinafter cited as SAINSBURY].
92. Id. at 89.
93. An exhaustive investigation, Sainsbury's research in London boroughs isolates the variables
of poverty, unemployment, overcrowding, social mobility and disorganization, sex, marital status,
physical illness, monthly incidence, alcoholism and personality abnormality.
94. Id. at 28 ("The problem, then, becomes one of assessing the relative contributions of the
influences causing conflict and tension.").
[Vol. 1970: 166
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While Durkehim and his disciples analyzed suicide in its societal
context, a second school of investigators, the Freudian psychologists,
emphasized its individual aspects. 5 Unlike his contemporary, Emile
Durkehim, Sigmund Freud never addressed himself squarely to the
study of suicide. The phenomenon did, however, appear in his works
peripherally as a result of his theory of eros and thanatos, the life and
death instincts." Only one paper specifically developed some of Freud's
ideas on suicide.
In that paper, "Mourning and Melancholia,"' 7 he compared the
symptoms of the two conditions, noting that in each case the afflicted
person reacted to the loss of something. In mourning, the loss was of
a person or of an abstraction which has replaced a person. Painful
dejection, a lack of interest in the outside world, an incapacity to love
and an inhibition of all activity further characterized mourning.
Melancholia, on the other hand, possessed all of the foregoing
attributes and one more: it also displayed "a lowering of the self-
regarding feelings to the degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches
and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of
punishment.""' Like mourning, melancholia was a reaction to the loss
of a loved object. But often the melancholiac, although recognizing a
loss, had no conscious perception as to what it was he had lost." To
Freud this suggested a relationship between melancholia and the
unconscious loss of a love-object as distinguished from the completely
conscious nature of the loss experienced in mourning.1"°
These two indicia of melancholy, unconsciousness and declining self-
esteem, carried grave dangers of suicide. The melancholiac, having lost
a love-object and unable to transfer the libido'0' to another, withdrew
that libido into the ego which, in turn, was then identified with the
abandoned love-object.' The loss of the latter became transformed
95 To denominate this group as -'Freudian psychologists" is not to deny the interest or
contributions of -'non-Freudians" to the study of suicide. See B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUNIAN
BWHAV iog 232 (1953). Rather, it is to emphasize the stronger influence of Freud on later
ps> chological-psychiatric investigations of suicide.
96 See D. Jackson. Theories oj Suicide in CLUES TO SUICIDE 12 (E. Schneidman & N. Farberow
eds 1957) [hereinafter cited as JACKSON]; PORTERFIELD at 50.
97 S FREUD, Mourning and Melancholia 1917 in IV COLLECTED PAPERS 152-70 (1950)
Ihereinafter cited as FREUD].
98 Id. at 153.
99 Id. at 155.
100 Id
101 Libido is the form of energy used by the life instincts. C. HALL, A PRIMER OF FREUDIAN
PSWI ( OLOGY 59 (1954) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
102 FREUD at 159.
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into a loss of the ego, creating conflict "between the criticizing faculty
of the ego and the ego as altered by identification."' 13 Hate and self-
torment resulted because loss of a love-object occasioned "an excellent
opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself felt
and come to the fore."'' 0 In the end suicide might result when hate gave
rise to murderous impulses, that is, impulses against others re-directed
upon the melancholiac himself.05
Freud's explanation of suicide has significantly influenced the present
generation of psychologists and psychiatrists,"' Dr. Karl Menninger
'being foremost among these. Menninger's theory originates in Freud's
suggestion that suicide is a murderous impulse derived from anger
intended for a love-object but directed instead to the self. He finds three
components of the suicidal act: the wishto kill, the wish to be killed
and the wish to die. The wish to kill arises from the destructive instinct
latent in every person.07 Ordinarily in civilized society, psoitive feelings
such as love inhibit this destructive instinct enabling the constructive
life instinct to be asserted. This situation, as Menninger points out,
avoids suicide: "To the extent which the constructive tendencies
overtake and neutralize their deathbent predecessors, suicidal effect is
deflected, deferred or completely circumvented."'0 8 These constructive
tendencies extend through periods of weak neutralization, characterized
by chaning moods, to the other extreme, suicide, in which the death
instinct overtakes the life instinct.0 9 To illustrate this concept of the
103. Id.
104. Id. at 161.
105. It is this sadism, and only this, that solves the riddle of th tendency to suicide which
makes melancholia so interesting-and so dangerous. As the primal condition from which
instinct-life proceeds we have come to recognize a self-love of the ego which is no immense,
in the fear that rises up at the meance of death we see liberated a volume of narcissistic
libido which is so vast, that we cannot conceive how this ego can connive at its own
destruction. It is true we have long known that no neurotic harbours thoughts of suicides
which are not murderous impulses against others re-directed upon himself, but we have
never been able to explain what interplay of forces could carry such a purpose through to
execution. Now the analysis of melancholia shows that ego can kill itself only when, the
object cathexis having been withdrawn upon it, it can treat itself as an object, which it is
able to launch against itself the animosity relating to an object-that primordial reaction
on the part of the ego to all objects in the outer world.
Id. at 162-63.
106. See Jackson at 12-14.
107. K. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF 26-28 [hereinafter cited as MENNINGER].
108. Id. at 32.
109. ld. at 28.
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wish to kill, Menninger, following Freud, relies heavily on a discussion
of melancholia. 0
The nature of the conscience explains Menninger's second
component, the wish to be killed."' Clinical experience has revealed
certain laws governing the conscience: (1) when a person attacks
something in his environment, the conscience simultaneously makes a
similar attack upon the ego; 12 (2) the ego must "adjust the strong
instinctive demands of the personality not only to the possibilities
afforded by the external world but to the dictates of this conscience;"' 13
and, (3) "in the unconscious a wish to destroy is quite equivalent to
the actual destruction with regard to exposing the ego to
punishment.""' Thus, these laws demonstrate Freud's hypothesis:
suicides may be "disguised murders" insofar as they reveal an
unconscious need for that type of punishment.1 5
Finally, the wish to die stems from Freud's death instinct, a
controversial postulate." 6 Menninger accepts the broad concept,
although recognizing its hypothetical nature,1 7 but defines it is his own
terms as "an undifferentiated portion of the original stream of self-
destructive energy ('death instinct') separate from that which has been
converted, on the one hand, into externally directed aggression in the
service of self-preservation and, on the other, into the formation of
conscience. " ' Whereas the death instinct in a normal person emerges
gradually, it erupts suddenly in the suicide. Thus, Menninger expands
Freud's study of melancholy into a full psychodynamic theory,
composed of the interaction of complex psychological motives.
The etiology of suicide remains today in its formative stages. No one
has yet synthesized psychological and sociological findings, although
researchers in each discipline recognize their dependency upon the
I10 Id at41-50.
111. Menninger defines conscience as "an internal, psychological representation of authority,
originally and mainly parental authority but used in later life with prevalent ethical, religious,
and social standards. It is largely formed in infancy and childhood and seldom keeps pace with
the changes in external environment. Id. at 51.
112. Id. at 52-53. For a discussion of Freud's concept of ego, see HALL at 27-31, 41-46.
Essentially, the ego is a psychological system concerned with transactions between an individual
and the world.
113 MENNINGER at 53.
114 Id. at54.
115 Id at 55.
116. JACKsON at 16,
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other." 9 Their findings, too, demonstrate remarkable similarity. While
sociologists, for example, have spoken of social disintegration between
the individual and his environment, psychologists discuss this same
concept of isolation in terms of the effect of object loss on the ego.,"
Both recognize this as a contributing factor to suicide, although one
emphasized the external and the other the internal . 2
Further, no one cause of suicide exists. 22 Instead, many factors
coalesce to produce it. 2 1 Causation itself presents difficulties which
social scientists prefer to make "the permanent word of
metaphysicians. 1 2 4 More often, they speak in terms of factors,
variables or motivations contributing to the suicidal act. Even the
theories offered by investigators purport not to be definitive
formulations, but rather suggestions to aid subsequent empirical
research.'2 Recognizing suicide's kaleidioscopic nature, social scientists
must then deal withthe relative strength of'each contributing factor as
it affects the individual case, because what elicits suicidal responses in
one person may have no effect upon another.26 Suicide, consequently,
admits no simple etiology, but requires instead, a detailed evaluation
of each situation.
119. Williams, Changing Attitudes to Death, HUMAN RELATIONS 421 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as WILLIAMS]. See also GIaBs at 5-18.
120. WILLIAMS at 421-22.
121. B. BosSELMAN,Self-Destruction viii (1958).
122. Contra, Johnson, Durkheim's One Cause of Suicide, 30 AM. Soc. REv. 875-86 (1965).
Johnson argues that Durkehim's theses can be reduced to a unicausal theory of suicide, namely,
that the more integrated a societal group is, the lower its suicide rate will be. It is unclear whether
Johnson is merely interpreting Durkheim or, in addition, endorsing this unicausal theory as his
explanation of suicide. In any case, his article presents a minority position, one which has been
often refuted by others. See GIBs at 18 (no need to find an "ultimate cause"); STENGEL at 112
("There is always more than one reason for a suicidal act . . ."); Jackson at 15-16 ("Thus, it
may be artificial, even misleading, to describe suicide from the point of view of a single motivation
123. Thus, suicide can be viewed as a combination of the individual's inner emotional
make-up and external stress or extreme social pressures-a concatenation of "psychic
forces" and "environmental factors." The psychic forces (of dependence, hostility,
identification and so forth) stem from childhood conditioning based on biologic and
cultural factors; the environmental factors (such as pain, wartime heroic sacrifice, cultural
suttee or harakiri) stem from unfortunate current stressful situations which recapitulate
childhood trauma or emphasize cultural mores.
JACKSON at 16.
124. GIaBS at 18.
125. See, e.g., GIaBs & MARTIN at 218-25; MARIS at 187.
126. "The suicidal act, then, is a highly complex behavior pattern which reflects conflicting
tendencies and whose outcome depends on their relative strength and on unpredictable factors."
STENGEL at 112.
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III
RATIONALE
Tate v. Canonica, utilizing the Restatement's analysis of intentional
torts, suggests that the tortfeasor's action must only be a substantial
factor in bringing about the suicide for recovery to be allowed. On the
other hand, the old rule, and the rule still universally applied in
negligence cases, is that the tort must be the cause of the suicide. 12
A. Negligently induced suicide.
It is easy to justify the negligence rule after analyzing sociological
and psychological studies. The sociologists, refusing to find the cause
for suicide, will only consider the factors contributing to the act.'2 If
society produces an individual who inclines toward suicide under the
sociologists' theory, it seems unfair, as a matter of policy, to visit the
liability on a single individual, who, by his negligence may have
precipitated the injury. The social-psychologists offer no method to
weigh the importance of the relevant factors. Under their theory, then,
liability cannot depend on the relevant factors. Under their theory,
then, liability cannot depend on the relevant contribution of the
tortfeasor's actions.
Freudians emphasize the loss of love-objects and the resulting
ascension of the death instinct . 24 This may help a court to find that
the loss of a particular "love-object" or the impairment of ego from
a -disfiguration" caused the death instinct to predominate.
Nonetheless, except in instances of obvious impairment of the ego
resulting from something like severe burns or scars, it is impossible to
foresee the emphasis an individual will place on a particular "object"
or to foresee what circumstances may combine to emphasize
theimportance of the lost object or impaired ego perception. Neither
the courts nor apparently the psychologists are equipped to make such
127 In Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1963) plaintiff's deceased was injured in an
automobile accident, allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendant. Four and one-half
months later, deceased committed suicide by shooting himself. The jury trial resulted in a verdict
for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed, alleging various grounds for error. Among the alleged
errors was the trial court's jury instruction that the jury must find and believe that the death was
"'the direct and proximate result of the accident. . . ." The supreme court affirmed, stating that
to be the cause of the suicide, the tort must have created either an irresistable impulse or caused
a state of frenzy such that the suicide was involuntary.
128. See notes 69-94, supra, and accompanying text. See also notes 119-126 and accompanying
text.
129 See notes 70-118, supra, and accompanying text.
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detailed analysis of the individual, especially after his death has
rendered his cooperation impossible.
It should also be noted that Freudian psychology, especially that
which derives its conclusions from his concept of the death instinct, has
been less than universally accepted.Y3 0 Thirdly, even in cases where the
ego or self concept is seriously impaired by accident, most people are
not driven to suicide.13' It is the confluence of surrounding factors,
often unforeseeable, that enables the "death instinct" to emerge
paramount. If any traditional concept of foreseeability is applied, a
court cannot impose liability because the confluence of factors remains
unforseen.
B. Irrestible impulse.
Additionally both the sociologists and the Freudians would probably
agree on the unworkability of the irresistible impulse test. A
psychiatrist would most likely say that the suicide itself exemplifies that
the impulse was "irresistible." At most, this test allows courts and
juries, in exceptional circumstances, to impose liability for negligent
torts, or to adopt a different position for intentional torts, by finding
that the decedent's actions resulted from an "impulse which he could
not resist.' 32
C. The substantial factor test.
The factor analysis suggested by Tate agrees with the psychological
interpretation of suicide. Injury can be a factor, even a substantial or
critical factor, in the commission of suicide. But should it, as a matter
ofpolicy, justify liability? Though it might be more forseeable in the
context of malicious prosecution or abuse of process, there is always
the chance that the deceased will commit suicide just to cause trouble
and justify a larger recovery against the defendant. So far as causation
is concerned, psychologists would not be willing to say, as the Tate
equivalency of emotional distress and suicide requires, that the
emotional distress caused by the tort causes the suicide. Emotional
distress itself comprises only an element in the mass of factors that
cause suicide. As Durkeim and those following him point out,
sociological considerations play a substantial role. But should they be
considered? In an intentional tort situation, the pressure to "take the
130. See note 116, supra.
131. Menninger's tripartite theory evidences this proposition. See text, pp. 6-7, supra.
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injured as you find him" is stronger than in negligence cases, as the
Tate Court points out by its use of sections 279 and 280.
The rationale of section 312 offers a better approach. If harm is
intentionally inflicted, liability should result if the defendant should
have known that some sort of mental illness or bodily harm would
result . 32 This allows the court, by a test of negligence, to consider the
severity of the distress inflicted and how reasonable it is that someone
would take his own life when the particular harm is inflicted on him.
I f, as the Tate Court said, all of history shows that persons can be
goaded into suicide, then a jury should be able to decide under the
question of due care, whether the defendant had, or should have had,
some idea that the deceased might be so mentally harmed by the
intentional tort that he would kill himself. This approach has the
advantage of focusing on the individual situation, forcing the court and
the jury to consciously appraise the seriousness of the defendant's
conduct, and the normality of the deceased's response. Especially
appealing is its failure to deny recovery just because the decedent is
more susceptible to the tort than most people. This approach requires
a value judgment as to how normal his response is. It may not assure
that the right disposition will be made, but it does assure that the right
questions will be asked.
132. State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth,_ Miss.-_, 214 So. 2d 579 (1968).
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